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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LECIA SWALLOW, f.k.a. 
LECIA KENNARD, 
Appellant/Petitioner, 
vs. 
RANDY KENNARD 
Appellee/Respondent. 
Case No. 20070198-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a post divorce domestic relations matter wherein a default 
judgment was entered by the district court. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in 
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2)(h) (1953 as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Given the stated basis in Mrs. Swallow's Rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, motion and supporting memoranda whether the district court lacked discretion 
to deny her motion to set aside the default judgment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A clear showing of abuse of discretion by the district 
court in that it's ruling was arbitrary, capricious, or not based upon adequate 
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findings of fact or law. Katz v. Peirce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1987); Pacer Sport 
and Cycle, Inc. v. Myers, 534 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1975). Findings of fact are 
reviewed under a "clear error standard" and a "district court's conclusions of law 
for correctness." Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480, 502 (Utah 2006). 
"[Qjuestions about the legal adequacy of findings of fact and the legal accuracy of 
the trial court's statements present issues of law, which [are reviewed] for 
correctness. Wall v. Wall 157 P.3d 341, 343 (Utah App. 2007). 
2. Whether Mrs. Swallow's new claims of error, never presented to the district 
court for consideration or correction, are sufficient to require this Court to reverse the 
district court's ruling? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Exceptional circumstances or plain error; as shown by 
meaningful, orderly and intelligent juxtaposition by the appellant to the record by 
which the district court's rulings can be measured. State v. All Real Property, 95 
P.3d 1211, 1213 (Utah App. 2004), aff'd 127 P.3d 693 (Utah 2005); Fackrell v. 
Fackrell 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987). A denial of motion to set aside a default 
judgment does not usually reach the issue of the merits of the underlying claim 
unless it is found to rest upon flawed legal conclusions. Searle v. Searle, 38 P.3d 
307, 312 (Utah App. 2001). 
CITATION SHOWING ONLY SOME OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
WERE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL 
In her Rule 60 (b) motion Mrs. Swallow preserved only some of the issues 
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presented here for appeal, to include: 
1. Claims of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" premised 
upon her attorney's claimed failure to receive three documents. 
(Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment, page 2; Affidavit of Craig Bainum, page 2). 
2. Her claim that it is not the practice for clerks of court to enter a default 
against a party who has an attorney of record when pleadings have been 
filed; and, 
3. Her claim that it would place a financial burden upon her to be responsible 
for the transportation costs associated with one visit per year by the parties 
children with Mr. Kennard. 
(Reply to Respondent's Objection to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, page 
3). 
Mrs. Swallow did not provide any notice or basis in her Rule 60 (b) motion and 
memoranda sufficient to preserve her new claims of purported error, to include: 
4. Claimed failure to regard the best interest of the parties children (Brief of 
Appellant pages 2, 19, 20); 
5. Claimed failure to correctly make financial determinations as to child 
support (Brief of Appellant pages 2, 10); 
6. Claimed existence of inadequate findings regarding imputation of income to 
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Mrs. Swallow (Brief of Appellant page 10); 
7. Claimed existence of inadequate findings regarding modification of the 
parties divorce decree which terminated payments determined to be alimony 
(Brief of Appellant pages 10, 15); 
8. Claimed errors related to the timing and sequence of discovery (Brief of 
Appellant pages 3, 6, 15, 17, 18); 
9. Claimed failure of the matter not being heard by a domestic relations 
commissioner (Brief of Appellant pages 4, 7, 9, 13, 17); 
10. Claimed error in not submitting the matter to mediation (Brief of Appellant 
pages 7, 9, 18); 
11. Claimed error in not appointing a guardian ad litem (Brief of Appellant 
page 20). 
CONTROLLING STATUTES & RULES 
(Set forth in the Addenda) 
Child Support & Imputation of Income 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-3 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-4 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.2 (1) and (2) (a) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5 (7) (a), (b) and ( c) 
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Discovery 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (f) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 29 
Domestic Relations Commissioner 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 6-401 
Mediation 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-39 
Modification or Divorce Decree 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (3) 
Relief from Judgment or Order 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 (b) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal by Mrs. Swallow from the district court's denial of her Rule 60 
(b) motion to set aside a default judgment previously entered upon her failure to: 
1. File a responsive pleading to Mr. Kennard's amended petition to modify the 
parties divorce decree; and, 
2. Provide discovery as required by the district court's order on a motion to 
compel. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, 
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page 1). 
The default judgment entered by the district court: (i) increased Mr. Kennard's 
child support obligations to Mrs. Swallow; (ii) terminated Mr. Kennard's continued 
obligation to pay $500 dollars per month alimony; (iii) required Mrs. Swallow to pay a 
debt of $3,498 dollars related to the purchase of the marital home awarded Mrs. Swallow 
in the divorce decree; and, (iv) allocated to Mrs. Swallow the responsibility for the 
transportation costs associated with one visit per year by the parties children with Mr. 
Kennard occasioned by her relocation to Texas. (Default Judgment, pages 1, 2). 
The district court's based it' denial of Mrs. Swallow's motion to set aside the 
default judgment upon findings that: 
1. She had failed to file responsive pleadings due to "carelessness and neglect 
to the proceeding"; and, 
2. Findings that the court was "unpersuaded" that Mrs. Swallow had otherwise 
"set forth good cause as required by law" in her motion as evidenced by 
other circumstances and improprieties related to the case. 
(Ruling, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, pages 3,4). 
B. Course of Trial Court Proceedings & Facts of the Case 
On March 7, 2005 the parties were divorced. (Appellant's Appendix 3: District 
Court Docket, page 5). The parties divorce "was truly one caused by irreconcilable 
differences; there never having existed any conduct by either party during the divorce that 
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would have been the basis for a divorce caused by neglect, mistreatment, abuse, infidelity, 
or any other outrageous behavior." (Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, Re: Default 
Judgment, page 2, j^ 2; Affidavit of Respondent in Support of Motion to Compel, j^ 3). 
Other than the marital home awarded to the Mrs. Swallow, the parties owned little 
or no assets of consequence at the time of the parties divorce. (Amended Petition to 
Modify Divorce Decree1, page 3, ^ [17; Answer to Respondent's Request for Admissions2 
Nos. 1, 2 and Interrogatory No. 1). 
It had been contemplated in the parties divorce decree that Mrs. Swallow would 
begin working to help support herself and the parties children. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Re: Default Judgment, page 2, If 4). 
Mrs. Swallow has not sought employment since the divorce despite her ability to 
be employed. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Default Judgment at page 
1,18). 
In approximately June of 2006 Mrs. Swallow remarried and relocated with the 
parties children to Texas. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Default 
Judgment, page 2, ^ 1). 
On May 4, 2006 Mr. Kennard filed and served upon Mrs. Swallow a petition to 
deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 8 (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2As evidenced in Mr. Kennard's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel 
Answers to Requested Discovery, page 3, Mrs. Swallow's answers were before the 
district court as an appendix to his motion and referenced therein. See Appendix 15. 
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modify child support based upon an increase to his salary and requested the court to 
impute income to Mrs. Swallow for child support purposes. 
On May 22, 2006 Mrs. Swallow filed and served upon Mr. Kennard her response 
denying that income should be imputed to her; along with a counter-claim alleging that 
circumstances had sufficiently changed such that Mr. Kennard should be made 
responsible for Mrs. Swallows mortgage on her home; a debt which had been obligated to 
her solely under the parties divorce decree (Decree of Divorce, pages 1,2). (Answer and 
Counterclaim to Verified Petition to Modify Child Support and Impute Income to the 
Petitioner). 
On May 25, 2006 Mr. Kennard filed and served his reply to Mrs. Swallow's 
counterclaim. 
On May 25, 2006 Mr. Kennard contacted Mrs. Swallow's attorney by letter stating 
that he was "desirous of expediting [the] matter as fast and inexpensively as possible" and 
requesting that Mrs. Swallow provide him with certain information necessary to enable 
him to present his case to the court. The requested information related to Mrs. Swallow's 
current financial circumstances; the prospective sale the home awarded her in the divorce 
decree; and all the circumstances she claimed that would preclude her from being 
employed. (Ruling, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment page 4; Verified 
Objection, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, Exhibit E). 
On May 30, 2006 Mrs. Swallow's attorney contacted Mr. Kennard by letter 
-8-
indicating that Mrs. Swallow agreed to provide the information requested related to the 
prospective sale of her home; and the claimed basis of Mrs. Swallow's inability to work; 
but refused to provide the information related to Mrs. Swallow's current financial 
circumstances. (Ruling, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, page 4; Verified 
Objection, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, Exhibit E). 
On June 1, 2006 Mr. Kennard filed and served on Mrs. Swallow an amended reply 
to her counterclaim admitting that the parties circumstances had changed such that the 
court should reconsider allocation of the debts and obligations of the parties as Mrs. 
Swallow had alleged; and requesting the court to temporarily freeze any prospective 
monies Mrs. Swallow might receive from the sale of her home until such time as a final 
determination of the matters before the court. (Amended Reply to Petitioner's Counter-
claim Paragraph No. 2). 
On June 12, 2006 Mr. Kennard contacted Mrs. Swallow's attorney in a follow up 
letter in response to his dated May 30, 2006 in which Mr. Kennard proposed and outlined 
a discovery plan consistent with the requirements of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
26. (Ruling, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, page 4; Verified Objection, Re: 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, Exhibit). 
In addition Mr. Kennard included with the letter formal discovery pleadings, vis-a-
ve, requests for admissions, interrogatories and production of documents. These formal 
discovery pleadings included requests for the same information requested previously by 
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letter on May 25, 2006; to include identification and documentation of each offer she 
received to purchase her home. Id. 
Also enclosed with the letter was the proposed amended petition to modify the 
divorce decree, along with Mr. Kennard's motion to the district court for leave to file the 
same. Mr. Kennard requested in his letter to know whether Mrs. Swallow intended to 
object to the filing of the proposed amended petition to modify the divorce decree. Id. 
On July 19, 2006 Mr. Kennard filed and served Mrs. Swallow with notice that his 
requests for admissions were deemed admitted based upon her failure to file responses. 
On that same date Mr. Kennard filed and served upon Mrs. Swallow a motion to compel 
answers to the outstanding interrogatories and request for production of documents; and a 
notice to submit for decision his motion for leave to file the amended petition to modify 
the divorce decree, which motion had never been responded to by Mrs. Swallow. 
On July 21, 2007 the court issued it's order granting Mr. Kennard leave to file his 
amended petition to modify the divorce decree. 
On July 24, 2006 Mrs. Swallow filed and served Mr. Kennard with her belated 
answers to his requests for admissions, interrogatories and production of documents; 
which included many instances of objected to and incomplete answers related to, among 
other things, her claimed inability to work and information related to her current financial 
circumstances. 
Also on this date Mr. Kennard served Mrs. Swallow with his amended petition to 
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modify the divorce decree; a 20 day summons; and, a copy of the court's order granting 
him leave to file the amended petition. Mr. Kennard filed a copy of the summons with 
the court on the same date; and on October 24, 2006 filed a certificate of service of these 
documents upon Mrs. Swallow with the court. 
On September 12, 2006 Mr. Kennard filed and served upon Mrs. Swallow a 
memorandum and affidavit in support of his previously filed motion to compel discovery 
addressing the necessity of the requested incomplete or objected to answers provided in 
Mrs. Swallow discovery responses served upon him on July 24, 2006. 
On September 21, 2006 Mr. Kennard called and left a message with Mrs. 
Swallow's attorney concerning the motion to compel and amended petition to modify, 
notifying him again of the deadlines and asking whether discovery could be resolved 
without a hearing? (Ruling, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, page 3). 
On September 26, 2006 Mr. Kennard spoke again with Mrs. Swallow's attorney on 
the phone and it was stipulated that Mrs. Swallow could have until Oct. 6, 2006 to file a 
response to his motion to compel discovery. (Ruling, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment, page 3). 
On October 6, 2006 Mr. Kennard spoke again with Mrs. Swallow's attorney on the 
phone wherein Mrs. Swallow was given by stipulation until October 13, 2006 to respond 
to the amended petition to modify the divorce decree. In the phone conversation Mr. 
Kennard indicated that he would not give anymore time to Mrs. Swallow to respond to his 
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motion to compel. Mrs. Swallow's attorney indicated that Mrs. Swallow still objected to 
providing the requested discovery and that he wanted Mr. Kennard to request a hearing on 
his motion. Mr. Kennard indicated to Mrs. Swallow's counsel that he would not request a 
hearing; only file a notice to submit for decision. (Ruling, Re: Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment, page 3, 4; Verified Objection, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment, Exhibit E; Verified Objection, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, 
Exhibit E). 
On October 12, 2006 Mr. Kennard filed and served upon Mrs. Swallow his notice 
to submit regarding his motion to compel discovery; which notice included a copy of the 
proposed order compelling discovery later signed by the district court judge. Mrs. 
Swallow received these documents (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, page 6, TJ24). Mrs. Swallow never filed or served 
a response to the motion to compel discovery. 
On October 16, 2006 the court issued it's order compelling Mrs. Swallow to 
answer the requested discovery "within 14 days." (Order, Re: Motion to Compel). This 
is the first of three documents Mrs. Swallow's attorney claims to have never received in 
her motion to set aside the default judgment. 
On October 17, 2006 Mr. Kennard filed a certificate showing service of the court's 
order compelling discovery on Mrs. Swallow. 
On November 7, 2006 Mr. Kennard filed a notice to submit regarding entry of 
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default for Mrs. Swallow's failure to file a responsive pleading to the amended petition; 
which notice contained a certificate of service upon Mrs. Swallow. This is the second of 
three documents Mrs. Swallow's attorney claims to have never received. 
On November 13, 2006 the clerk entered a default against Mrs. Swallow after first 
submitting the application for entry of default to the district court judge for review on 
November 8, 2006. (Appellate's Appendix 3: District Court Docket, page 7). 
On November 14, 2006 Mr. Kennard served Mrs. Swallow with the district court's 
entry of default. This is the last document Mrs. Swallow's attorney claims to have never 
received. 
On November 17, 2006 Mrs. Swallow entered into a new real estate purchase 
contract for her home which by it's terms would prospectively provide her with a net 
profit of $99,000 dollars cash upon closing. Mrs. Swallow never disclosed the existence 
of this contract to Mr. Kennard then or at any time during the pendency of these 
proceedings despite her agreement to do so and Mr. Kennard's discovery requests. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, 
page 8,1J38, H39). 
On December 7, 2006 Mr. Kennard filed and served upon Mrs. Swallow an 
application for entry of default judgment along with a supporting affidavit and a notice to 
submit. Mrs. Swallow has never challenged that she was served with these documents. 
Default judgment was sought upon Mrs. Swallow's failure to file a responsive pleading to 
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the amended petition to modify the divorce decree as well as her failure to provide 
discovery as ordered by the court. 
On December 11, 2006 Mrs. Swallow's attorney filed a change of address with the 
district court changing only the mailing, not the physical, address of his office. 
On December 12, 2006 the district court entered it's default judgment against Mrs. 
Swallow based upon her failure to provide a responsive pleading to the amended petition 
to modify the divorce decree and failure to provide ordered discovery. 
On December 22, 2006 Mrs. Swallow finalized the sale of her home by attending a 
real estate closing in Utah netting her a net cash profit of $99,000 dollars. Mrs. Swallow 
represented to Mr. Kennard at the time that she was "in town for a wedding" arranging 
for him to watch the children on what was later discovered to be the day of the real estate 
closing based upon her representing to him that "she had some things planned." Mrs. 
Swallow never disclosed the fact of the sale of the home to Mr. Kennard at this or any 
time during the pendency of these proceedings in the district court. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, page 8, ^|41, ^ |42; 
Ruling, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment page 4; Supplemental Information, 
Re: Objection to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, page 3). 
On January 2, 2007 Mrs. Swallow filed and served upon Mr. Kennard her Rule 60 
(b) motion to set aside the default judgment, along with memorandum and affidavit. 
On or about January 4, 2007, after becoming aware through a credit denial that the 
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mortgage payment of Mrs. Swallow's home was showing delinquent, Mr. Kennard 
contacted Mrs. Swallow and made a direct inquiry as to the status of the house and 
whether it was still for sale. In response to his direct inquiry Mrs. Swallow failed to 
disclose that the house had been under contract or had been sold, deflecting Mr. 
Kennard's questions by stating "everything was under control." (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, page 8, {^42; Ruling, Re: 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment page 4; Supplemental Information, Re: Objection 
to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, page 2, 3). 
On January 9, 2007 Mr. Kennard filed and served upon Mrs. Swallow a verified 
objection to Mrs. Swallows motion to set aside the default judgment. 
On January 11, 2007 Mr. Kennard filed and served upon Mrs. Swallow a 
memorandum of supplemental information regarding his objection to her motion which 
included newly discovered evidence showing that she had failed disclose the fact and 
circumstances related to her selling the home; and misrepresented the amount of the debt 
owed on the home in her previous answers to discovery. (Ruling, Re: Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment page 4; Supplemental Information, Re: Objection to Motion to 
Set Aside Default Judgment). 
On January 29, 2007 Mr. Kennard filed a notice to submit on Mrs. Swallow's 
motion to set aside the default judgment. 
On January 30, 2007 Mrs. Swallow filed a reply to Mr. Kennard's objections to 
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setting aside the default judgment which left uncontroverted Mr. Kennard's claims related 
to the facts and circumstances surrounding her failure to disclose the sale of the home. 
(Reply to Respondent's Objection to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment). 
Also on that date Mrs. Swallow filed a belated answer to the amended petition to 
modify the divorce decree. She never provided a response to the district court's motion to 
compel. 
On February 1, 2007 the court issued it's ruling denying Mrs. Swallow's motion to 
set aside the default judgment along with findings of fact, conclusions of law and order. 
On March 1, 2007 Mrs. Swallow filed her notice of appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court entered a default judgment against Mrs. Swallow on the basis of 
her failure to: (a) file a responsive pleading to the amended petition to modify the divorce 
decree; and (b) failure to provide discovery as ordered by the court. 
In her Rule 60 (b) motion Mrs. Swallow preserved only some of the issues raised 
here on appeal to include claims of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect" premised upon her attorney's claimed failure to receive three documents which 
the court found to have been duly served upon her. The district court's refusal to set aside 
the default judgment based upon findings of "carelessness and neglect to the proceeding" 
and otherwise being "unpersuaded" of good cause are reasonable decisions supported by 
sufficient findings based upon the record and applicable law. 
-16-
Mrs. Swallow other claimed errors, never presented to the district court, are 
likewise insufficient to require this Court to reverse. In many instances Mrs. Swallow 
fails to provide a meaningful analysis of the claims presented. Furthermore a close 
analysis of facts of this case and the district court's findings bear out that no errors exist 
and that the district court's rulings did not result in manifest injustice to Mrs. Swallow or 
the parties children. 
This Court should sustain the ruling of the district court on the basis that it is a 
reasonable exercise of it's discretion given the facts and circumstances of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE THE DISTRICT HAD DISCRETION 
TO REFUSE TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Generally the fact that the district court could have set aside a default judgment 
does not automatically mean that it abused it's discretion in refusing to do so when there 
is a basis to support the refusal. Katz. V. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986); Airkem 
Intermountain Inc., v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (Utah 1973); Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 
562, 569-570 (Utah App. 2007); Black's Title Insurance, Inc. v. Utah State Insurance 
Department, 991 P.2d 607, 610 (Utah App. 1999). 
A. District court's finding of inexcusable "carelessness and neglect" to the 
proceedings is a reasonable conclusion supported by the record and 
based upon sufficient findings 
The district court entered a default judgment premised upon Mrs. Swallow's 
failure to: 
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1. File a response to the amended petition to modify the divorce decree; and 
2. Provide discovery as required by it's order on a motion to compel. 
Mrs. Swallow filed a motion to set aside the default judgment based upon a claim 
that her attorney had failed to receive three documents: 
a. The district court's order compelling discovery dated October 16, 
2006; 
b. Mr. Kennard's notice to submit, re: entry of default judgment, dated 
November 7, 2006; and 
c. The district court's entry of default dated November 13, 2007. 
The court found, and Mrs. Swallow acknowledged, that each of these had duly been 
served upon her by Mr. Kennard. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Motion 
to Set Aside Default Judgment, page 2, ^ 2-5; Reply to Respondent's Objections to 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, page 2). 
In it's ruling denying Mrs. Swallow's motion to set aside the default judgment the 
district court found that in respect to her claimed basis of "mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect" occasioned by the claimed failure to receive the three 
documents identified above, even if true, under the circumstances of this case did not 
equate to a sufficient basis to set aside the default judgment: 
"[T]he record is uncontroverted that [Mrs. Swallow] was advised that her 
response to the AmendedPetition to Modify'was delinquent and that a response 
to the motion to compel was needed.... In light of such communications, it is 
apparent that [Mrs. Swallow] was fully aware of the need to file a response to 
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the Amended Petition to Modify Divorce Decree and the pending Motion to 
Compel. [Mrs. Swallow's] apparent failure to file responsive pleadings, 
therefore, is not a consequence of failing to receive documents, but an apparent 
carelessness and neglect to the proceeding. The [c]ourt notes [Mr. Kennard's] 
other references of [Mrs. Swallow's] limited involvement to the proceeding.... 
For these reasons and those articulated in [Mr. Kennard's] Verified Objection 
and Supplemental Information, the [c]ourt is unpersuaded that [Mrs. Swallow] 
has set forth good cause as required by law to set aside the entry of default. 
As such the motion is respectfully denied. Given this Ruling, the [c]ourt will 
enter [Mr. Kennard's] tendered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order regarding the motion." 
(Ruling, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, page 3 and 4). 
Both appellate courts in Utah have held that neglect, to provide a reasonable basis 
to set aside a judgment under Rule 60 (b), must constitute excusable neglect; defined by 
this Court as "the exercise of due diligence by a reasonably prudent person under similar 
circumstances." Franklin Covey Client Sales v. Melvin. 2 P.3d 451 (Utah App. 2000). 
See also Fackrell v. Fackrell 740 P.2d 1318, 1320 (Utah 1987) (no showing why 
appellant father's neglectful actions were excusable); Helgesen v. Inyanguamia, 636 P.2d 
1079, 1081 (Utah 1981) (excusable neglect in that insurance adjuster was waiting for 
further information promised him by plaintiffs attorney; and he reasonably understood 
from a letter that he would be granted additional time to accept plaintiffs settlement 
offer); Pacer Sport and Cycle. Inc. V. Myers. 534 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1975) (finding that 
none of appellant's claimed reasons for failing to file a responsive pleading even 
approached excusable neglect); Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 68 P.3d 1008, 
1011-12 (Utah App. 2003) (trial court's mistakes found to be the reason the entry of 
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judgment went undetected; appellant found to have exercised diligent efforts to stay 
apprised of the status of her case); Black's Title Insurance, Inc. v. Utah State Insurance 
Department. 991 P.2d 607, 611-12 (Utah App. 1999) (appellant's claim that he was 
unable to respond to a complaint because he was under doctor's care was insufficient to 
establish excusable neglect because he failed to describe the illness or explain how it 
prevented him from responding); Hendry v. Critchfield 2005 WL 3315327 (Utah App.) 
(Unpublished opinion) (appellant's claim that he lacked knowledge of the trial date 
insufficient to set aside judgment due to his lack of involving himself in the proceeding); 
Mitchell v. Harrington Trucking, Inc., 2000 WL 33249366 (Utah App.) (Unpublished 
opinion) (appellant's neglect in failing to file a responsive pleading was not excusable 
because he was on notice of a specific deadline to respond and should have been on a 
heightened sense of diligence as the deadline approached); State in the interest of S.N.R., 
M.A.R., and J.R., 1999 WL 33244698 (Utah App.) (Unpublished opinion) (appellants 
claimed excuse in being absent from trial based upon claimed reliance on an actual 
incorrect courtesy notice issued by the court found to be insufficient because they had 
failed to exercise due diligence of maintaining proper contact with their attorneys); BCW 
Enterprises, Inc. V. Lund, 1999 WL 33244655 (Utah App.) (Unpublished opinion) 
(appellant's neglect not excusable where he had already received the pleading to which he 
was required to respond and he provided no adequate explanation for his failure to 
respond; his failure to ensure his mail was sent to the correct address did not constitute 
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excusable neglect); Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. v. Alva, 1999 WL 33244657 
(Utah App.) (Unpublished opinion) (appellants should have been on notice that they must 
inform the court of outstanding discovery issues; only evidence before the court at the 
entry of summary judgment was a complete absence of formal discovery). 
In this present action Mrs. Swallow provided almost no basis to the district court 
for her failure to answer the amended petition to modify the divorce decree. Her only 
articulated basis being that because the district court's "order [compelling discovery] of 
October 16, 2006 dealt only and specifically with outstanding discovery issues... [Mrs. 
Swallow] was unaware that the lack of an answer [to the amended petition] was part of 
the default." (Reply to Respondent's Objection to Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, 
pages 1,2). 
Similar to the appellant in Black's Title Insurance, Inc. v. Utah State Insurance 
Department, supra, this generalized statement by Mrs. Swallow provides no explanation 
of why she failed to file a response to the amended petition to modify in the first place; 
especially in light of the telephone conversations between Mr. Kennard and Mrs. 
Swallow's attorney on September 21, 26 and October 6, 2006 (Ruling, Re: Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment, page 3); and fact that she was "fully aware of the need to file a 
response" (Ruling, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, page 3). 
Additionally, as related to Mrs. Swallow's claimed basis for not providing 
compelled answers to discovery, the district court found that Mrs. Swallow had: 
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"unreasonably failed to follow up on the status of [Mr. Kennard's] Motion to 
Compel for two months despite... knowing that: (a) she was in default; and (b) 
[that Mr. Kennard] was filing a notice to submit." 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, 
page 6, K 27). Added to this is the fact that it is undisputed that Mrs. Swallow received the 
notice to submit and a copy of the proposed order. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, page 5, If 24). 
The district court's decision in finding inexcusable neglect on the part of Mrs. 
Swallow in regards to the issue of failing to respond to ordered discovery is also 
consistent with rationale as stated in the holdings of the Utah appellate cases, supra, cited 
above. 
This decision is further supported by the other contemporaneous circumstances 
and improprieties the court found existed as discussed below. 
B. The district court's other stated reasons for being "unpersuaded" of 
good cause are reasonable conclusions supported by the record and 
based upon sufficient findings 
As stated in the district court's ruling there are other reasons "as articulated in [Mr. 
Kennard's] Verified Objection and Supplemental Information " which left it "unpersuaded 
that [Mrs. Swallow] had set forth good cause as required by law to set aside the default." 
(Ruling, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, page 4). These included, among 
other things, Mrs. Swallows contemporaneous faults in: 
a. Failing to disclose the existence of a contract for the sale of the home which 
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by it's terms would net Mrs. Swallow approximately $99,000 cash profit at 
closing. 
b. Failure to disclose the finalization of the sale of her home which netted 
Mrs. Swallow approximately $99,000 cash profit at closing. 
c. Failure to disclose the sale of the home to Mr. Kennard despite direct 
inquiries from him concerning the status of the home on or about January 4, 
2007. 
d. Attributing more than $8,000 additional debt owing to her home than was 
actually owing in response to Mr. Kennard discovery requests. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
pages 7-9,^31-44). 
As shown by Mrs. Swallow's response to Mr. Kennard's objections to setting aside 
the default judgment (Appendix ), these sworn allegations of impropriety were left 
uncontroverted by Mrs. Swallow and were justifiably adopted as findings by the court 
providing additional basis for it's ruling declining to set aside the default judgment. As 
the court noted in it's findings: 
"[She] had made her household income, debts and obligations relevant to 
the action when she filed her Counter-Claim on May 12, 2006 seeking 
"that visitation be modified to reflect the Petitioner's move to Texas, and 
that the parties be mutually responsible for the mortgage payment on the 
marital residence until it is sold. ... Both of these prayers for relief 
necessarily would have required the Court to make an equitable 
determination based in part upon the parties current financial condition." 
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(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment, page 4, ffl| 13, 14.) 
"Issues regarding the value of the home and the equity therein figured 
prominently in the pleadings and memoranda before the Court such that 
Petitioner should have been aware of the materiality of such disclosures." 
Id. at page 7, ^ 36. 
As stated in Chrysler v. Chrysler. 303 P.2d 995, 996 (Utah 1956) "a prime 
requisite precedent to the granting of such relief [setting aside a default judgment] is that 
the movant demonstrate that he comes to the court with clean hands and in good faith." 
C. Regarding other preserved claims of error: 
1. That it is not the practice for clerks of court to enter a default 
against a party who has an attorney of record when pleadings 
have been filed 
The court docket makes it clear that the entry of default in this matter only 
occurred after the application was presented by the clerk to the district court judge for 
review on November 8, 2006. (Appellate's Appendix 3: District Court's Docket, page 7). 
2. That it would place a financial burden to be responsible for the 
transportation costs associated with one child visitation per year 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-37 subsections (2) and (3) authorizes a court upon the 
relocation of one party to make "appropriate orders regarding ... parent time 
transportation." Including an "order that the parent intending to move to pay the costs of 
transportation for at least one visit per year with the other parent." 
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Given the finding that Mrs. Swallow relocated to Texas with the parties children 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Default Judgment, page 2, f 1) and the 
findings made concerning the parties respective financial circumstances, including that 
Mrs. Swallow's current household income was approximately $90,051 dollars per year 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Default Judgment, page 4, ^ 22), the 
district court made a reasonable ruling supported by sufficient findings that she should be 
responsible for the transportation costs associated with one visit per year of the children 
with Mr. Kennard. The reasonableness of this decision is further supported by the district 
court's acceptance and adoption of the sworn statements contained in Mr. Kennard's 
affidavit in support of motion to compel and affidavit in support of default judgment. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Default Judgment, page 2, ^ 2). 
II. NEW CLAIMS OF ERROR ARE INSUFFICIENT TO REQUIRE 
REVERSAL OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING 
Generally an appellant is prohibited from raising new issues never presented to the 
district court for consideration and correction unless she can show exceptional 
circumstances or plain error by meaningful, orderly and intelligent juxtaposition to the 
record by which the district court's rulings can be measured. State v. All Real Property, 
95 P.3d 1211, 1213 (Utah App. 2004), affd 127 P.3d 693 (Utah 2005); Fackrell v. 
Fackrell 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987). 
As stated above, Mrs. Swallow has presented in her appellate brief numerous 
claims of error which were never presented to the trial court in her Rule 60 (b) motion to 
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set aside the default judgment. In presenting many of these new claims Mrs. Swallow 
fails in many respects to provide by juxtaposition to the record any meaningful analysis to 
assist the Court. 
A. Claims related to child support & children's best interests 
Mrs. Swallow's makes new claims that the district court wrongfully disregarded 
the interests of the parties children by entering an order effecting child support by default; 
and failing to correctly make financial determinations of child support within the default 
judgment. Directly related to these claims is the additional claim that the district court 
made inadequate findings related to imputation of income to Mrs. Swallow and failure to 
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the children. Despite her several claims, Mrs. 
Swallow fails to provide any meaningful analysis of the district court's findings in these 
regards. 
There are, however, in contrast to her claims reasonable and sufficient findings 
related to these matters contained in the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law related to the default judgment; and by the district court's adoption by reference 
therein to Mr. Kennard's affidavit in support of his motion to compel and affidavit in 
support of default judgment. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Default 
Judgment, page 2, ^ 2). 
Utah law requires both a mother and father to financially support their children 
absent a finding of unusual circumstances. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-3 and 4. Children 
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are ''presumed to be in need of the support." Id. The unusual circumstances which 
preclude parent from financial responsibility for their children vis-a-ve child support is a 
finding by a court that either: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care approach or equal the amount the custodial 
parent can earn; (ii) the parent is physically or mentally disabled; (iii) the parent is 
in engaged in career or vocational training to establish basic job skills; or (iv) 
unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the parents presence in the 
home. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5 (d). 
When income is imputed to a parent for child support purposes, which is explicitly 
allowed when a "party defaults"(Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5 (7) (a)), the amount of 
income imputed "shall be based" upon one of two methods outlined; to include the 
method by which the district court determined Mrs. Swallow's income, based "upon the 
median earning for persons in the same occupation in the same geographical area as 
found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics." A/, at subsections (a) 
and (b). (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Default Judgment, page 3, ^  9). 
In support of it's decision to impute income to Mrs. Swallow within the default 
judgment the district court found that: 
1. Mrs. Swallow has remarried since the divorce and relocated with the parties 
children to Texas. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Default 
Judgment page 2, ^ 1). 
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2. At the time of the parties divorce it was contemplated that Mrs. Swallow 
would begin working to support herself and the parties children. (Id. at 
page 2, % 4). 
3. Mrs. Swallow has a bachelors degree in elementary teaching and four years 
full-time teaching experience. (Id. at page 2, f^ 3). 
4. As per to the figures maintained by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics the current median annual wage of elementary teachers 
in Texas, where Mrs. Swallow now resides, is $3,498 per month. (Id. at 
page 3, H 9). 
5. All of the parties children are normal, healthy children who attend public 
schools and who suffer from no unusual conditions that would require Mrs. 
Swallows presence in the home or would preclude her from being gainfully 
employed. (Id. at page 2,1j 2; Affidavit in Support of Default Judgment, 
page 2, ffl[ 4, 5). 
6. Mrs. Swallow currently has no intention to return to employment outside 
the home due in significant reason to her personal belief that a mother of 
minor children should not work outside the home. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Re: Default Judgment, page 2, [^f 5, 6). 
7. Mrs. Swallow has failed to comply with the court's order compelling her to 
disclose specific information concerning what conditions she claims would 
-28-
preclude her from working outside the home. {Id. at page 2, j^ 7). 
8. Mrs. Swallow has not sought employment since the divorce despite her 
ability to be employed. {Id. at page 1,^8). 
9. Mrs. Swallow is voluntarily unemployed. {Id. at page 2, j^ 8). 
10. Income should be imputed to the Petitioner for child support purposes at 
$3,498 dollars per month. {Id. at page 3, \ 10). 
11. Mrs. Swallow's current household income, without her being employed, is 
approximately $90,051 dollar per year or $7,504 dollar per month. 
(Appendix page 4, ^ 22). 
12. Mrs. Swallow's and the children's circumstances since her remarriage have 
changed such that their current standard of living is greater than the 
standard of living the parties maintained when they were married. {Id. at 
page 5, If 25). 
13. Mrs. Swallow and the parties children are able to maintain a good standard 
of living. {Id. at page 5, f^ 26). 
The methodology the district court followed in determining imputation of income 
to Mrs. Swallow is consistent with procedures set forth in Utah Cope Ann. §78-45-1, et 
al. (as amended). Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.3 (2)(a) allows the 
documentation necessary to determine income of a party for child support purposes to be 
provided by "a verified representation of... the moving party, based upon the best 
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evidence available, may be submitted." This is the method by which the information was 
presented to the district court and by which the district court chose to arrive at a 
determination of imputation of income to Mrs. Swallow. 
These district court's findings provide a reasonable and appropriate analysis of the 
district court into the best interest of the parties children and appropriately the factors 
related to imputation of income to Mrs. Swallow despite the nature of the judgment being 
one entered by default. 
While the district court made no explicit finding related to the now claimed issue 
of the costs of daycare (Appellate brief 10-11), the court found, and Mrs. Swallow 
previously acknowledged in her belated answers to discovery3, that she currently has no 
intention to engage in employment outside the home and that a significant reason for that 
being her personal belief that mothers of minor children should not work outside the 
home (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Default Judgment, page 2, f^lf 5, 6; 
Answer to Respondent's Request for Admissions, Interrogatories, and Production of 
Documents, Answer to Request for Admissions No. 22, 23, 27; Application for Default 
Judgment, page 5). These facts formed the basis for the district court's ruling related to 
it's determination to impute income to Mrs. Swallow and thus should render the issue 
raised here moot. In addition the parties divorce decree requires both parties to share 
equally the costs associated with daycare (Decree of Divorce, f^ 12) which further 
3
 See explanation footnote 2. 
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supports a conclusion that the district court's failure to explicitly address this issue in it's 
findings did not result in manifest injustice to Mrs. Swallow. 
Based upon the largely uncontroverted evidence existing in the record it was not 
unreasonable for the court to determine that insufficient facts existed to preclude Mrs. 
Swallow from being responsible for her share of child support consistent with the child 
support guidelines; thus implementing the presumption that both her and Mr. Kennard 
should be financially responsible for their children. This conclusion is moreover 
reasonable in light of the fact that the court presided over the parties divorce proceedings 
since it's inception, including a order to show cause hearing wherein evidence was 
presented, and had entered the original findings and decree of divorce in this matter. The 
divorce decree itself contemplated that Mrs. Swallow would begin working (Decree of 
Divorce, Tflj 9, 12, 13); and contains no reference to unusual circumstances as outlined by 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5 (d) which would preclude her having income imputed to her 
for child support purposes. 
Also relevant to the claimed errors addressed here, Mrs. Swallow argues for the 
first time on appeal that there is "no indication in the record that the setting aside fo the 
default judgment would [have] resulted] in substantial injustice to [Mr. Kennard]." 
(Appellant Brief, page 12). This claim ignores the district court's statement in it's 
findings that "[Mr. Kennard] would likewise be hampered in his ability to produce 
additional evidence at any subsequent hearing due to [Mrs. Swallow's] failure to comply 
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with this [c]ourt's Order, Re: Motion to Compel...". (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, Re: Default Judgment, page 7, \ 36). 
In support of that conclusion is the fact there appears no evidence that Mrs. 
Swallow ever made any effort to comply with the district court's order compelling 
discovery "within 14 days" (Order, Re: Motion to Compel) despite by her own account 
learning of the existence of the district court's order approximately one and a half months 
prior to the court making it's ruling denying her Rule 60 (b) motion. (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, page 6, \ 27). 
In addition, the method by which the district court arrived a determination of child 
support distinguishes this case from Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984) which 
Mrs. Swallow cites as a basis for her claim that this Court should go behind a review the 
denial of her Rule 60 (b) motion to address the underlying merits of this case. In Larsen 
the Court was dealing with a default paternity action which it upheld on the basis of 
appellant's inexcusable neglect in answering a petition but nevertheless remanded for a 
hearing to determine child support because under the then status of the law it "was neither 
a sum certain nor a sum readily calculable, and the court did not take evidence as to the 
reasonableness of the amount." Id. at 56. It is important to note that this case precedes 
the legislation creating the child support guidelines contained in Utah Code Ann. §78-45-
7.14 which "apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing or modifying an 
award of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989" and which guidelines carry with 
-32-
them "a rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or 
permanent child support." Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.2 (1), (2). 
Unlike the Larsen case, here the district court used a statutory authorized method 
of arriving at a figure of income and applied it to the presumptive correct child support 
guideline table. In addition, the court terminated Mr. Kennard's responsibility for a $500 
dollar alimony payment clearly defined and established in the divorce decree; and his 
responsibility for a debt of $3,416 which amount was established by affidavit (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Default Judgment, page 2, j^ 2; Affidavit in Support of 
Default Judgment, page 4, f^ 20) and left uncontroverted in Mrs. Swallow's motion to set 
aside the default judgment. 
Lastly, while it is undisputed that the district court has power to appoint private or 
public guardian ad litems in cases when it deems it appropriate, it does not appear that 
anything exists under the facts of this case that would have made an appointment 
mandatory; and thus constitute plain error. See Rule 17 ( c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure (mandatory appointment in case where minor is a defendant in a civil matter or 
when a defendant to an action is insane); Utah Code Ann. §62A-6-l 11 (mandatory 
appointment of handicapped persons to be sterilized); Utah Code Ann. §78-7-45 
(discretionary appointments where issues of custody or visitation at issue); Utah Code 
Ann. §75-5-104 (discretionary appointments in probate matters); Utah Code Ann. §78-
3a-350 (discretionary appointments in cases involving child in custody of juvenile court 
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on the basis of delinquent behavior); Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-912 (discretionary 
appointment in juvenile courts generally); Utah Code Ann. §78-3h-102 (discretionary 
appointments in cases involving allegations of child abuse). 
B. Claim of inadequate findings to support modification of the divorce 
decree 
Mrs. Swallow claims for the first time on appeal that the district court made 
inadequate findings related to modification of the property settlement provisions 
contained in the divorce when it determined them to be in reality alimony and terminated 
Mr. Kennard's responsibility for their continued payment. 
The issue of whether a basis existed to modify the parties property settlement 
contained in the divorce decree arose when Mrs. Swallow, in response to Mr. Kennard's 
request to impute income to her, alleged by counterclaim that facts existed sufficient to 
allow the district court to modify the parties divorce decree and require Mr. Kennard to be 
responsible for the mortgage payment on her home, a debt awarded her solely in the 
divorce decree. Now Mrs. Swallow claims manifest injustice or plain error based upon 
the district court exercising it's equitable powers she maintained it so possessed. 
As admitted by Mrs. Swallow in her counterclaim to Mr. Kennard original petition 
to modify the divorce decree, Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5 (3) vests the district court with 
"continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for... distribution of 
the properly and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary." As part of this 
equitable power the court also has specific continuing jurisdiction to make changes which 
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bear on the welfare of the children. Id. 
Utah case law recognizes this equitable authority to modify provisions related to 
the distribution of property. As stated in Chandler v. West, 610 .2d 1299, 1300 (Utah 
1980) "property settlements are not sacrosanct and are not beyond the power of a court of 
equity to modify.... under traditional equity standards so required." See also Bair v. Bair, 
737 P.2d 177 (Utah 1987) (upon petition to modify divorce decree the court examined the 
intent behind provision entitled "wife support" determining in reality that it was a 
property settlement). 
Mrs. Swallow claims there are inadequate findings contained in the default 
judgment to support the courts termination of Mr. Kennard's continued obligation to pay 
Mrs. Swallow $500 per month cash and to require Mrs. Swallow to pay the remaining 
balance $3,498 of debt used to purchase the home awarded her in the divorce decree 
(Default Judgment, fflf 3, 4); both payments the district court found to be in reality 
alimony. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Default Judgment, page 4,1J16). 
Relevant to this issue is Holt v. Holt, 672 P.2d 738 (Utah 1983) wherein the Utah 
Supreme Court found that, consistent with both Utah and federal bankruptcy law, the 
fundamental inquiry related to determining whether a debt is really "in the nature of 
alimony, maintenance or support" is: 
"if without the debt assumption, the spouse would be inadequately supported, the 
debt assumption was meant to be support." Id. At 742. 
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Prior to the entry of the default judgment Mrs. Swallow had within the pleadings before 
the court admitted facts supportive of a finding that the monies at issue were in reality in 
the "nature of alimony, maintenance or support" {Id.) when she stated under oath in 
responses to discovery4 that: 
a. "At that at the time of the divorce the provisions of the divorce decree did 
not provide either party with sufficient income to maintain a reasonable 
standard of living..". (Answer to Request for Admissions No. 51). 
b. At the time of the divorce there existed little or no assets other than the 
marital home awarded to the Mrs. Swallow. (Answers to Request for 
Admissions Nos. 1 2; Answer to Request for Interrogatory No. 1). 
Relevant to the modification issue, vis-a-ve the holding in Holt supra, was the 
district court order compelling Mrs. Swallow to provide answers to discovery which 
included a requirement for her to state her position behind the inclusion, and the meaning, 
of a provision of the divorce decree which states: 
"This property settlement shall not be dischargeable, reduced or modified by ... any 
bankruptcy proceeding." (Decree of Divorce, 1J17). 
(Answers to Respondent's Request for Admissions5 Nos. 68, 69, 70, 71). 
As contained in the factual findings of the default judgment there exists a 
4
 See explanation footnote 2. 
5
 See explanation footnote 3. 
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sufficient basis to support the district court's ruling terminating Mr. Kennard's continued 
responsibility to pay what it determined was alimony. Central to the basis behind the 
district court's rulings was the explicit inclusion of the sworn statements contained in Mr. 
Kennard affidavit in support of his motion to compel discovery and his affidavit in 
support of default judgment; which the court stated it "accepts as true and adopts herein 
as findings." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Default Judgment, page 2, f^ 
2). Through the adoption of these the district court made many detailed findings related 
to how the provisions of the property settlement came into existence, and what the 
intention was behind their inclusion into the divorce decree. See Affidavit in Support of 
Motion to Compel, pages 8 - 10, ^  36-43. 
Likewise within the adopted findings contained in the affidavit in support of 
motion to compel are reasonable basis for the district court's unusual, but reasonable, 
determination that in this case Mrs. Swallow's remarriage was not seen by the parties as 
"a viable, reasonably foreseeable, future event that would enable [Mrs. Swallow] to 
elevate her and the children's financial circumstances..". (Affidavit in Support of Motion 
to Compel, page 10, ^  45). Kg. Kelly v. Kelly, 9 P.3d 171, 178 (Utah App. 2000) 
(remarriage alone cannot justify a modification absent explicit support appearing in the 
record). 
In addition, the district court within the text of the findings of the default judgment 
found that: 
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1. The parties circumstances had changed such since the divorce that it was 
equitable for the Court, given the circumstances of the parties and the best 
interest of the children, to modify the parties divorce decree in relation to 
the payment of the monies it determined were in reality alimony. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Default Judgment, page 2, ^ 
(0(d)). 
2. What became the property settlement provisions of the divorce decree were 
incorporated into the divorce with the intended purpose to provide 
perceived necessary additional financial support for Mrs. Swallow and the 
parties children; and was in no way derivative of a division of any actual 
assets of the marriage. (Id. at page 3, <(] 15). 
3. Although the payment of the monies at issue were entitled property 
settlement, these provision were in reality payments of alimony. (Id. at 
page 4, Tj 16). 
4. Without relief from the court as to the payment of the monies at issue here, 
and without imputing income to the Mrs. Swallow, her household income 
would effectively rise to approximately $105,696 per year or $8,808 per 
month while Mr. Kennard's income after taxes would be approximately 
$2,500 dollars per month. (Id. at page 5, ^ 23). 
5. Mrs. Swallow failed to provide specific information concerning her 
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household income, expenses and debts despite the court's order compelling 
discovery. (Id. at page 5, f^ 24). 
6. "The circumstances of the [Mrs. Swallow] and parties children have since 
changed due to [Mrs. Swallows] remarriage such that their standard of 
living, without the necessity of Respondents continued payments [of the 
monies at issue here], is greater than the standard of living the parties 
maintained while they were married." (Id. at page 5, ^ f 25). 
7. "[Mrs. Swallow] and the parties children are able to maintain a good 
standard of living without the additional payment of monies [determined to 
be alimony]." (Id. at page 5, Tf 26). 
8. "In contrast [Mr. Kennard] under the current terms of the divorce decree is 
unable to maintain the standard of living he enjoyed when the party were 
married." (Id. at page 5, If 27). 
9. "Because of [Mrs. Swallow's] remarriage and the subsequent change in her 
and the children's financial circumstances, it is inequitable to require [Mr. 
Kennard] to continue to pay to the Mrs. Swallow, or on her behalf, the 
monies [determined to be alimony] and the [c]ourt should grant relief 
therefrom." (Id. at page 5, f^ 28). 
10. "[Mrs. Swallow's] relocation to Texas with the parties children has created 
a situation whereby [Mr. Kennard] is limited in his ability to have regular 
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visitation with the parties children due to the distances involved and [his] 
limited financial ability." {Id. at page 6, j^ 29). 
11. "Given the current circumstances of the parties it is also not in the best 
interest of the children to require [Mr. Kennard] to continue to pay to [Mrs. 
Swallow], or on her behalf, the monies [at issue here]... as it effects their 
need to have meaningful contact with their father in the future and his 
financial ability to effectuate the same." {Id. at page 6, ^ 30). 
12. "Furthermore the ancillary conditions related to [Mr. Kennard's] payment 
of the monies [at issue here], the necessity of maintaining two jobs, or of 
leaving his current employment in attempts to earning more money from 
another occupation is not in the best interests of the children as it effects 
their continued regular receipt of the monies [Mr. Kennard] pays for child 
support; it being in their best interest in this respect that he remain in good 
standing in his current employment." {Id. at page 6, If 31). 
Respectfully given these and other findings existing in the record it was not 
unreasonable for the district court to modify the parties divorce decree. 
C. Claims of error related to discovery 
Mrs. Swallow raises for the first time on appeal claimed errors related to discovery 
process. Mrs. Swallow claims that she "may have believed" Mr. Kennard could not 
properly propound or go forward with discovery because he had (i) failed to submit a 
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proposed Rule 26, discovery planning order under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and 
(ii) allegedly committed error when he filed contemporaneously with his discovery 
requests a motion with the court for leave to file an amended petition to modify the 
parties divorce decree. 
It is important to note that Mrs. Swallow's current claims in regard to the Rule 26 
discovery order are in direct conflict to her statement to the district court when she 
represented that "this issue does not go to the issue of the Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment..". (Reply to Respondent's Objection to Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment, page at 2). 
Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides the procedures governing the 
"sequence and timing of discovery." Id. Generally speaking the parties are to confer "as 
soon as practicable after the commencement of the action" to "discuss the nature and 
basis of their claims and defenses, to discuss the possibilities for settlement" and to 
develop a "stipulated discovery plan." Id. at subparagraph (f)(1). 
As previously stated by the Utah Supreme Court the purpose of the discovery 
rules: 
"is to make procedure as simple and efficient as possible by eliminating any 
useless ritual, undue rigidities or technicalities which may have become 
engrafted in our law; and to remove elements of surprise or trickery so the 
parties and the court can determine the facts and resolve the issues as directly, 
fairly and expeditiously as possible. In accord with this is the beginning policy 
statement in Rule 1(a): that the rules 'shall be liberally construed to secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 
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Ellis v. Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1967). 
Consistent with this purpose Rule 26 and Rule 29, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
allow the parties to stipulate to the method and timing of discovery differently than 
outlined within the rule: 
"The following applies to all cases... except as otherwise stipulated."', and 
"[UJnless otherwise stipulated by the parties... a party may not seek discovery 
from any source before the parties have met and conferred as required..". 
Rule 26 (f) and (d) (emphasis added). 
"The parties may by written stipulation... modify the procedures provided by these 
rules for discovery...". 
Rule 29. 
In this case consistent with the rule, and contained in the record, Mr. Kennard 
contacted Mrs. Swallows attorney by letter on May 25, 2007 wherein he indicated his 
desire of "expediting this matter as fast and inexpensively as possible" and informally 
requested information necessary for him to present his claims to the court. (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Default Judgment, page 2, ^ 2; Verified Objection, Re: 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, Exhibit E). By response letter dated May 30, 
2006 Mrs. Swallow indicated her explicit willingness to provide the information related 
to the house and Mrs. Swallows claimed inability to work; but objected to provide 
information related to her current financial circumstances. (Verified Objection, Re: 
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Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, Exhibit E). By response letter on June 125 2006 
Mr. Kennard indicated that "despite trying numerous times" he had "been unable to 
discuss with [Mrs. Swallows' attorney] a proposed discovery plan as required by Rule 26" 
and then went on to propose a detailed written discovery plan. (Verified Objection, Re: 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, Exhibit E). Attached with the letter were Mr. 
Kennard's propounded requests for admissions, interrogatories and request for the 
production of documents. On July 27, 2006 Mrs. Swallow filed her response to Mr. 
Kennard's requested discovery which later became the subject of his motion to compel. 
Never at anytime did Mrs. Swallow file anything with the district court or indicate 
to Mr. Kennard, that she opposed his discovery requests or the motion to compel on the 
basis that it was premature. Nor at any time did she indicate to the district court or to Mr. 
Kennard that she was not in agreement with the discovery plan as he had proposed in his 
letter to her attorney dated June 12, 2006. In contrast to these new claims, and as 
contained in the record, she responded to discovery as if it was properly propounded 
(Appellant's Appendix 3, page 6); and by conversation with Mr. Kennard obtained leave 
of additional time to respond to the motion to compel on September 26, 2006 (Ruling, Re: 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, page 3) which also contrasts her claim that she 
"may have believed" discovery could not properly go forward due to the existence of Mr. 
Kennard's amended petition. Usually a party cannot claim errors on appeal which they 
themselves invited. State v. Alfatlawl 153 P.3d 804, 814 (Utah). 
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While it is true that a copy of the stipulated discovery plan was not formally 
submitted in pleading form before the district court, it nevertheless was provided to the 
court in written form as an exhibit to Mr. Kennard's objection to setting aside the default 
judgment (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Re: Default Judgment, page 2, j^ 2; 
Verified Objection, Re: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, Exhibit E); and stipulated 
to in written form by the parties. Id. Presumably it informed the district court sufficiently 
of the parties agreement prior to it's decision to deny Mrs. Swallow's request to set aside 
the default judgment. The fact it was never filed as a formal pleading should not 
constitute manifest injustice or plain error under the circumstances of this case. 
D. Claimed error of failure to submit the matter to the Domestic Relations 
Commissioner 
Mrs. Swallow claims error in that the parties divorce post divorce proceeding 
action was never submitted to the domestic relations commissioner for the 4th District 
Court, Utah County, Commissioner Patton. 
Rule 6-401, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, itself, however, contains 
provisions which provide a basis for why a matter may end up directly before a district 
court judge when it states: 
a. The commissioner can certify cases directly to the district court which 
appear to require a hearing before the district court judge. Id. at 
subparagraph (3)(B). 
b. The commissioner does not have responsibility to handle "cases previously 
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certified to the district court..". Id. at subparagraph (3)(B). 
Even without explicit evidence existing in the record of the basis for the matter 
being placed before the district court, absent an affirmative showing of some misconduct 
by Mrs. Swallow this Court should rely on the presumption of regularity which attends a 
district court's operations generally. See Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1054 
(Utah App. 1990). Rule 6-401 does not appear to require written findings, or inclusion 
within the record itself, of the reasons a commissioner submits a matter directly to the 
district court judge. 
The fact that Mrs. Swallow now claims she and her attorney "would have 
reasonably expected" and "may have reasonably believed" the case would go before a 
domestic relations commissioner (Appellate brief 13, 17) stands in contrast to her original 
Rule 60 (b) motion, supporting memoranda and affidavit which appears to contain no 
reference to these concerns; which absence can also be explained by the presumption of 
regularity that attends the functions of the courts, and the expectation that a reasonable 
basis existed below to move the matter to the district court. 
Furthermore, no objections to the district court judge hearing the initial divorce 
appear in the record below and the fact that it was previously handled by the judge seems 
to preclude the domestic relations commissioner's responsibility for a case "previously 
certified to the district court" (Rule 6-401 (3)(B)) under the plain language of the rule. 
Similar to Appellant's new claims that "she may have believed" and "may well 
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have reasonably believed" things that do not appear in the record or in her Rule 60 (b) 
motion: Commissioner Patton may have believed it inappropriate to hear the parties 
original divorce matter due to Mr. Kennard's attorney, Mandy Jensen, having recently 
finished serving as his law clerk; thereby avoiding the appearance of a conflict of interest 
or impropriety. 
Even should this Court conclude that Mrs. Swallow and her attorney actually 
delayed or refused to act based upon a belief that the matter before the district court judge 
could not proceed further without a commissioner, the fact that a district court judge 
made rulings on matters to which a domestic relations commissioner in many instances 
could only offer suggestions (Rule 6-401, subsection (2)), would not appear to establish 
manifest injustice. 
E. Claimed failure to submit the matter to mediation 
Under the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §30-3-39 it appears that the intent of 
the statute is not to require a mediation session in every post divorce matter which arises 
in district court. As stated in the opening sentence the purpose of the statute is "to help 
reduce the time and tensions associated with obtaining a divorce." Id. at subparagraph 
no. 1. Further language therein supports the reasonableness of this interpretation when it 
states: "If, after the filing of an answer to a complaint of divorce, there are remaining 
contested issues..". Id. at subparagraph no. 2. 
As stated in the previous argument, the fact that Mrs. Swallow now claims that 
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"may have believed" the district court would not sign a final judgment and order without 
the case going to mediation (Appellate brief 18) stands in contrast to her original Rule 60 
(b) motion, supporting memoranda and affidavit which contain no reference to these 
concerns. Again, even should this court conclude that Mrs. Swallow or her attorney 
actually delayed or refused to act based upon a reasonable belief that the case would be 
going to mediation, the fact that a district court judge made rulings on matters which 
could possibly have been mediated does not appear to establish manifest injustice or plain 
error; especially in light of the previous finding that Mr. Kennard would be hampered at 
future hearings by Mrs. Swallow's failure to provide ordered discovery. (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, Re: Default Judgment, page 7, If 36). 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Swallow has failed to establish that the district court lacked discretion to 
refuse to set aside the default judgment entered. The district court followed proper 
procedures provided by statute in entering the default judgment; and in denying her Rule 
60 (b) motion to set it aside. The district court's ruling is reasonable under the facts of 
this case, consistent with applicable law, and supported by sufficient findings. This Court 
should decline to set it aside. 
Respectfully this 3 / day of August, 2007 
Randy Kennard 
Appellee pro s< 
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ADDENDUM 
1 Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (3) 
2 Utah Code Ann. §30-3-39 
3 Utah Code Ann. §78-45-3 and 4 
4 Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.2 (1) and (2) (a) 
5 Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5 (7) (a), (b) and ( c) 
6 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (f) 
7 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 29 
8 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 (b) 
9 Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 6-401 
10 Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund. Inc. v. Alva. 1999 WL 33244657 (Utah App.) 
(Unpublished opinion) 
11 BCW Enterprises. Inc. V. Lund. 1999 WL 33244655 (Utah App.) (Unpublished 
opinion) 
12 Hendry v. Critchfield. 2005 WL 3315327 (Utah App.) (Unpublished opinion) 
13 Mitchell v. Harrington Trucking. Inc.. 2000 WL 33249366 (Utah App.) 
(Unpublished opinion) 
14 State in the interest of S.N.R.. M.A.R.. and J.R.. 1999 WL 33244698 (Utah 
App.) (Unpublished opinion) 
15 Cover of Answers to Respondent's Request for Admissions, Interrogatories & 
Production of Documents showing district court date stamp 
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Tabl 

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and children --
Division of debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time --
Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the 
children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every 
decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental 
expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and 
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or 
liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's 
division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial 
responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may 
include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody 
of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the 
property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother and 
father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification. 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may 
include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, 
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under 
this chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is made 
and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the 
prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not 
asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a 
grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or 
parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party 
costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other 
party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time. 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by 
paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during 
the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of 
separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall 
consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have 
been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective 
standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of 
one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the 
marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been 
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a 
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been 
conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition 
which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding 
alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the 
recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be 
considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's 
improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. 
However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume 
if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
Amended by Chapter 129, 2005 General Session 
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Tab 2 
30-3-39. Mediation program. 
(1) There is established a mandatory domestic mediation program to help reduce the time and 
tensions associated with obtaining a divorce. 
(2) If, after the filing of an answer to a complaint of divorce, there are any remaining contested 
issues, the parties shall participate in good faith in at least one session of mediation. This requirement 
does not preclude the entry of pretrial orders before mediation takes place. 
(3) The parties shall use a mediator qualified to mediate domestic disputes under criteria established 
by the Judicial Council in accordance with Section 78-31b-5. 
(4) Unless otherwise ordered by the court or the parties agree upon a different payment arrangement, 
the cost of mediation shall be divided equally between the parties. 
(5) The director of dispute resolution programs for the courts, the court, or the mediator may excuse 
either party from the requirement to mediate for good cause. 
(6) Mediation shall be conducted in accordance with the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative 
Dispute Resolution. 
Enacted by Chapter 271, 2005 General Session 
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78-45-3. Duty of man. 
(1) Every father shall support his child and every child shall be presumed to be in need of the support 
of his father. Every man shall support his wife when she is in need. 
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 78-45-7.15: 
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and necessary medical and dental 
expenses, and other necessities are chargeable upon the property of both parents, regardless of the 
marital status of the parents. 
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses described in Subsection (2)(a) 
incurred on behalf of minor children. 
Amended by Chapter 161, 2000 General Session 
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78-45-4. Duty of woman. 
(1) Every woman shall support her child and every child shall be presumed to be in need of the 
support of his mother. Every woman shall support her husband when he is in need. 
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 78-45-7.15: 
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and necessary medical and dental 
expenses, and other necessities are chargeable upon the property of both parents, regardless of the 
marital status of the parents. 
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses described in Subsection (2)(a) 
incurred on behalf of minor children. 
Amended by Chapter 161, 2000 General Session 
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78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Use of ordered child support. 
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing or modifying an award of 
child support entered on or after July 1, 1989. 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing or 
modifying the amount of temporary or permanent child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by the guidelines, 
the award amounts resulting from the application of the guidelines, and the use of worksheets consistent 
with these guidelines are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of this section. 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclusion that complying with 
a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be 
unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the 
presumption in that case. If an order rebuts the presumption through findings, it is considered a deviated 
order. 
(4) The following shall be considered deviations from the guidelines, if: 
(a) the order includes a written finding that it is a deviation from the guidelines; 
(b) the guidelines worksheet has: 
(i) the box checked for a deviation; and 
(ii) an explanation as to the reason; or 
(c) the deviation is made because there were more children than provided for in the guidelines table. 
(5) If the amount in the order and the amount on the guidelines worksheet differ by $10 or more: 
(a) the order is considered deviated; and 
(b) the incomes listed on the worksheet may not be used in adjusting support for emancipation. 
(6) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of that parent and are not 
children in common to both parties may at the option of either party be taken into account under the 
guidelines in setting or modifying a child support award, as provided in Subsection (7). Credit may not 
be given if: 
(i) by giving credit to the obligor, children for whom a prior support order exists would have their 
child support reduced; or 
(ii) by giving credit to the obligee for a present family, the obligation of the obligor would increase. 
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute the obligations of the respective parents for 
the additional children. The obligations shall then be subtracted from the appropriate parent's income 
before determining the award in the instant case. 
(7) In a proceeding to adjust or modify an existing award, consideration of natural or adoptive 
children born after entry of the order and who are not in common to both parties may be applied to 
mitigate an increase in the award but may not be applied: 
(a) for the benefit of the obligee if the credit would increase the support obligation of the obligor 
from the most recent order; or 
(b) for the benefit of the obligor if the amount of support received by the obligee would be decreased 
from the most recent order. 
(8) (a) If a child support order has not been issued or modified within the previous three 
years, a parent, legal guardian, or the office may move the court to adjust the amount of a child support 
order. 
(b) Upon receiving a motion under Subsection (8)(a), the court shall, taking into account the best 
interests of the child: 
(i) determine whether there is a difference between the payor's ordered support amount and the 
payor's support amount that would be required under the guidelines; and 
(ii) if there is a difference as described in Subsection (8)(b)(i), adjust the payor's ordered support 
amount to the payor's support amount provided in the guidelines if: 
(A) the difference is 10% or more; 
(B) the difference is not of a temporary nature; and 
(C) the order adjusting the payor's ordered support amount does not deviate from the guidelines, 
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is not necessary for an adjustment under this 
Subsection (8). 
(9) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition the court to adjust the amount 
of a child support order if there has been a substantial change in circumstances. A change in the base 
combined child support obligation table set forth in Section 78-45-7.14 is not a substantial change in 
circumstances for the purposes of this Subsection (9). 
(b) For purposes of this Subsection (9), a substantial change in circumstances may include: 
(i) material changes in custody; 
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or assets of the parties; 
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent; 
(iv) material changes in the employment potential and ability of a parent to earn; 
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child; or 
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent for the support of others. 
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (9)(a), the court shall, taking into account the best 
interests of the child: 
(i) determine whether a substantial change has occurred; 
(ii) if a substantial change has occurred, determine whether the change results in a difference of 15% 
or more between the payor's ordered support amount and the payor's support amount that would be 
required under the guidelines; and 
(iii) adjust the payor's ordered support amount to that which is provided for in the guidelines if: 
(A) there is a difference of 15% or more; and 
(B) the difference is not of a temporary nature. 
(10) Notice of the opportunity to adjust a support order under Subsections (8) and (9) shall be 
included in each child support order. 
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78-45-7.5. Determination of gross ine^iru imputed income. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" itu hides prospective income from any source, 
including earned and nonearned income sources which may include salaries, wages, commissions, 
royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust 
income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, Social Security benefits, workers' 
compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, income replacement disability insurance benefits, 
and payments from "nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equiwiLni m one iuil-time 40-hour job. If 
and only if during the time prior to the original support order, the parent normally and consistently 
worked more than 40 hours at the parent's job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in 
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 3 5A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family Employment Program; 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership Act, 
Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or 
General Assistance; and 
(c) other similar means-tesied welfare benefits received h\ a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income I mm self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated by 
subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. 
The income and expenses from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to satisfy a child support award. 
Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to operate at a reasonable level ma\ be deducted 
from gross receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined undei m.•. . ! M ;. :s 
income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross tiiconic should first be computed on n .junuai basis and then 
recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date 
pay stubs or employer statements and complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year 
unless the court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification oi income from records 
maintained by the Department of Workforce Services may be substituted lor \\w stubs, employer 
statements, and income tax returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an underemployment or 
overemployment situation ex i sts. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed, the 
parent defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and the judge in a judicial proceeding or the 
presiding officer in an administrative proceeding enters findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the 
imputation. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and 
probable earnings as derived from employment opportunities, work history, occupation qualifications, 
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the cot nun rnity, or the median, earning for 
persons in the same occupation in the same geographical 
area as found
 m Hie statistics maintained by the Bureau oi Labor Statistics. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or a parent's occupation ;•• unknown, income shall be 
imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater income, the 
judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific 
findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be impute I if any oi the following conditions exist and the condition is not of a 
temporary nature: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children approach or equal the amount of 
income the custodial parent can earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial parent's presence in the 
home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a minor child who is the subject of a child 
support award nor benefits to a minor child in the child's own right such as Supplemental Security 
Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent shall be credited as 
child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting the amount against the 
potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as income to a 
parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
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Rule 26, General provisions governing discovery. 
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods. 
(a)(1) initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2) and except as otherwise stipulated or 
directed b.y order, a party shall without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties: 
(a)(1)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable 
information supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying the subjects of the 
information; 
(a)(1)(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, ail discoverable documents, data compilations, and 
tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the party supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for 
impeachment; 
(a)(1)(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party, making available for inspection 
and copying as under Rule 34 ail discoverable documents or other evidentiary material on which such computation Is 
based. Including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and 
(a)(1)(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under which any person carrying on 
an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the case or \o 
indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1) shall 
be made within 14 days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties 
or ordered by the court, a party joined after the meeting of the parties shall make these disclosures within 30 days after 
being served. A party shall make initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably available and is not 
excused from making disclosures because the party has not fully completed the investigation of the case or because 
the party challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or because another party has not made disclosures. 
(a)(2) Exemptions. 
(a)(2)(A) The requirements of subdivision (a)(1) and subdivision (f) do not apply to actions: 
(a)(2)(A)(i) based on contract in which the amount demanded in the pleadings is $20,000 ot less; 
(a)(2)(A)(ii) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making proceedings of an administrative agency: 
(a)(2)(A)(iii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C: 
(a)(2)(A)(iv) to enforce an arbitration award; 
(a)(2)(A)(v) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4; and 
(a)(2)(A)(vi) hi which any party not admitted to the practice law in Utah is not represented by counsel. 
(a)(2)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under subpart (a)(1) are subject to discovery under 
subpart (b). 
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used at trial to present evidence 
under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, this disclosure shall, with respect to a 
witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee 
of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the 
witness or party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the substance of 
the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; the 
qualifications of the witness, including a list of ail publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; 
the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has 
testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years. 
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by subdivision (a) 
(3) shall be made within 30 days after the expiration of fact discovery as provided by subdivision (d) or, if the evidence 
is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under 
paragraph (3)(B), within 60 days after the disclosure made by the other party. 
(a)(4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to other parties the following information regarding the evidence that it 
may present at trial other than solely for impeachment: 
(a)(4)(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone number of each witness, separately 
identifying witnesses the party expects to present and witnesses the party may call if the need arises; 
(a)(4)(B) the designation of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by means of a deposition and, if 
not taken stenographicaiiy. a transcript of the pertinent portions of the deposition testimony; and 
(a)(4)(C) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, including summaries of other evidence, 
separately identifying those which the party expects to offer and those which the party may offer if the need arises. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(4) shall 
be made at least 30 days before trial. Within 14 days thereafter, unless a different time is specified by the court, a party 
may serve and file a list disclosing (i) any objections to the use under Rule 32(a) of a deposition designated by another 
party under subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection, together with the grounds therefor, that may be made to the 
admissibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C). Objections not so disclosed, other than objections under 
Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, shall be deemed waived unless excused by the court for good 
cause shown. 
(a)(5) Form of disclosures. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, all disclosures under 
paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) shall be made in writing, signed and served. 
(a)(6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following methods: 
depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or 
permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; 
and requests for admission. 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope 
of discovery is as follows: 
(b)(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject 
matter involved \n the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the 
claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any 
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any 
discoverable matter, it Is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the 
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
(b)(2) Limitations. The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in Subdivision (a)(6) shall be 
limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is 
obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking 
discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the discovery is 
unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on 
the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own 
initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c). 
(b)(3) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain 
discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared 
in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including the 
party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery 
has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the case and that the party is unable without undue hardship 
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the 
required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation 
A party may obtain without the required showing a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously 
made by that party. Upon request, a person not a party may obtain without the required showing a statement 
concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that person. If the request is refused, the person may 
move for a court order. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the 
motion. For purposes of this paragraph, a statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed or otherwise 
adopted or approved by the person making it. or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a 
transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person making It and 
contemporaneously recorded 
(b)(4) Trial preparation: Experts. 
(b)(4)(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at 
trial. If a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B), any deposition shall be conducted within 60 days after the report 
is provided. 
(b)(4)(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed 
by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at 
trial, only as provided In Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for 
the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means. 
(b)(4)(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, 
(b)(4)(C){i) The court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent In 
responding to discovery under Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule; and 
(b)(4)(C)(ii) With respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(4)(A) of this rule the court may require, and with 
respect to discovery obtained under Subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the court shall require, the party seeking 
discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in 
obtaining facts and opinions from the expert. 
(b)(5) Claims of Privilege or Protection of Trial Preparation Materials. When a party withholds mtormation otherwise 
discoverable under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation material the 
party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not 
produced or disclosed in a manner that, v/tthout revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other 
parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection. 
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, accompanied by a 
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to 
resolve the dispute without court action, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or 
alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make 
any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 
burden or expense, including one or more of the following: 
(c)(1) that the discovery not be had: 
(c)(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or 
place: 
(c)(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking 
discovery; 
(c)(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; 
(c)(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court; 
(c)(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; 
(c)(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be 
disclosed only in a designated way; 
(c)(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be 
opened as directed by the court. 
if the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or \n part, the court may, on such terms and conditions as are 
just, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of 
expenses incurred \n relation to the motion. 
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for cases exempt under subdivision (a)(2), except as authorized under 
these rules, or unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party may not seek discovery from 
any source before the parties have met and conferred as required by subdivision (f). Unless otheavise stipulated by the 
parties or ordered by the court, fact discovery shall be completed within 240 days after the first answer is filed. Unless 
the court upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders otherwise, 
methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by 
deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to delay any other party's discovery. 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure under subdivision (a) or responded to a request 
for discovery with a response is under a duty to supplement the disclosure or response to include information 
thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in the following circumstances: 
(e)(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures under subdivision (a) if the party learns 
that \n some material respect the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective 
information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing. With 
respect to testimony of an expert from whom a report is required under subdivision (a)(3)(B) the duty extends both to 
information contained in the report and to information provided through a deposition of the expert. 
(e)(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory, request for production, or 
request for admission if the party learns that the response is in some material respect incomplete or incorrect and if the 
additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery 
process or \n writing. 
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference. 
The following applies to ail cases not exempt under subdivision (a)(2), except as otherwise stipulated or directed by 
order. 
(f)(1) The parties shall, as soon as practicable after commencement of the action, meet in person or by telephone to 
discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses, to discuss the possibilities for settlement of the action, to 
make or arrange for the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(1), and to develop a stipulated discovery plan. Plaintiffs 
counsel shall schedule the meeting. The attorneys of record shall be present at the meeting and shall attempt in good 
faith to agree upon the discovery plan. 
(f)(2) The plan shall include: 
(f)(2)(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures under subdivision (a), 
including a statement as to when disclosures under subdivision (a)(1) were made or will be made; 
(f)(2)(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be completed, whether discovery 
should be conducted in phases and whether discovery should be limited to particular issues: 
(f)(2)(C) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these rules, and what other 
limitations should be imposed; 
(f)(2)(D) the deadline for filing the description of the factual and legal basis for allocating fault to a non-party and the 
identity of the non-party; and 
(f)(2)(E) any other orders that should be entered by the court. 
(f)(3) Plaintiffs counsel shall submit to the court within 14 days after the meeting and in any event no more than 60 
days after the first answer is filed a proposed form of order in conformity with the parties' stipulated discovery plan. The 
proposed form of order shall also include each of the subjects listed in Rule 16(b)(1)-(6), except that the date or dates 
for pretrial conferences, final pretrial conference and trial shall be scheduled with the court or may be deferred until the 
close of discovery. If the parties are unable to agree to the terms of a discovery plan or any part thereof, the plaintiff 
shall and any party may move the court for entry of a discovery order on any topic on which the parties are unable to 
agree. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the presumptions established by these rules shall govern any subject 
not included within the parties' stipulated discovery plan. 
(f)(4) Any party may request a scheduling and management conference or order under Rule 18(b). 
(f)(5) A party joined after the meeting of the parties is bound by the stipulated discovery plan and discovery order, 
unless the court orders on stipulation or motion a modification of the discovery plan and order The stipulation or 
motion shall be filed within a reasonable time after joinder. 
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and objections Every request for discovery or response or objection 
thereto made by a party shall be signed by at least one attorney of record or by the party if the party is not represented, 
whose address shall be stated. The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that the person has 
read the request, response, or objection and that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief formed 
after reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass 
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation: and (3) not unreasonable or unduly 
burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in 
controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, if a request, response, or objection is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the party making 
the request, response, or objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is 
signed. 
if a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the 
person who made the certification, the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or both, an 
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of 
the violation, including a reasonable attorney fee. 
(h) Deposition where action pending in another state. Any party to an action or proceeding in another state may take 
the deposition of any person within this state, in the same manner and subject to the same conditions and limitations 
as if such action or proceeding were pending \n this state, provided that in order to obtain a subpoena the notice of the 
taking of such deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the court of the county in which the person whose deposition is 
to be taken resides or is to be served, and provided further that all matters arising during the taking of such deposition 
which by the rules are required to be submitted to the court shall be submitted to the court in the county where the 
deposition is being taken. 
(i) Filing. 
(i)(1) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file disclosures or requests for discovery with the court, 
but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the disclosures or requests for discovery have been 
served on the other parties and the date of service. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party shall not file a 
response to a request for discovery with the court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the 
response has been served on the other parties and the date of service. Except as provided in Rule 30(f)(1), Rule 32 or 
unless otherwise ordered by the court, depositions shall not be filed with the court. 
(i)(2) A party filing a motion under subdivision (c) or a motion undei Rule 37(a) shall attach to the motion a copy of the 
request for discovery or the response which is at issue. 
Advisory Committee Notes 
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Rule 29. Stipulations regarding discovery procedure. 
Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may by written stipulation 
(1) provide that depositions may be taken before any person, at any time or place, upon any notice, and in any manner 
and when so taken may be used like other depositions, and 
(2) modify the procedures provided by these rules for disclosure and discovery, except that stipulations extending the 
time for disclosure or discovery require the approval of the court if they would interfere with the time set for completion 
of discovery or with the date of a hearing or trial. 
Advisory C_ommjttee_Notes 
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from 
oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and 
after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected 
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms 
as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an 
adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of 
a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not iimit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure 
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
Advisory Committee Notes 
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Rule 6-401. Domestic relations commissioners. 
Intent 
To identify the types of cases and matters commissioners are authorized to hear, to identify the types of relief 
commissioners may recommend and to identify the types of final orders commissioners may issue 
To establish a procedure for judicial review of commissioners' decisions 
Applicability 
This rule shall govern all domestic relations court commissioners serving in the District Courts 
Statement of the Rule 
(1) Types of cases and matters All domestic relations matters filed in the district court in counties where court 
commissioners are appointed and serving including all divorce, annulment, paternity and spouse abuse matters, 
orders to show cause, scheduling and settlement conferences petitions to modify divorce decrees, scheduling 
conferences, and all other applications for relief, shall be referred to the commissioner upon filing with the clerk of the 
court unless otherwise ordered by the Presiding Judge of the District 
(2) Authority of court commissioner Court commissioners shall have the following authority 
(2)(A) Upon notice, require the personal appearance of parties and their counsel, 
(2)(B) Require the filing of financial disclosure statements and proposed settlement forms by the parties, 
(2)(C) Obtain child custody evaluations from the Division of Family Services pursuant to Utah Code Section 62A 4 106, 
or through the private sector, 
(2)(D) Make recommendations to the court regarding any issue including a recommendation for entry of final 
judgment, in domestic relations or spouse abuse cases at any stage of the proceedings, 
(2)(E) Require counsel to file with the initial or responsive pleading, a certificate based upon the facts available at that 
time, stating whether there is a legal action pending or previously adjudicated in a district or juvenile court of any state 
regarding the minor child(ren) in the current case, 
(2)(F) At the commissioner's discretion, and after notice to all parties or their counsel, conduct evidentiary hearings 
consistent with paragraph (3)(C) below, 
(2)(G) Impose sanctions against any party who fails to comply with the commissioner's requirements of attendance or 
production of discovery, 
(2)(H) Impose sanctions against any person who acts contemptuously under Utah Code Section 78 32 10, 
(2)(l) Issue temporary or ex parte orders, 
(2)(J) Conduct settlement conferences with the parties and their counselm a domestic relations case Issues that 
cannot be settled shall be certified to the district court for trial, and 
(2)(K) Conduct pretisal conferences with the parties and their counsel on ail domestic relations matters unless 
otherwise ordered by the presiding judge The commissioner shall make recommendations on all issues under 
consideration at the pietnal and submit those recommendations to the district court 
(3) Duties of court commissioner Under the general supervision of the presiding judge, the court commissioner has the 
following duties prior to any domestic matter being heard by the district court 
(3)(A) Review all pleadings \n each case; 
(3)(B) Certify those cases directly to the district court that appear to require a hearing before the district court judge; 
(3)(C) Except \n cases previously certified to the district court, conduct hearings with parties and their counsel for the 
purpose of submitting recommendations to the parties and the court. 
(3)(D) Coordinate information with the juvenile court regarding previous or pending proceedings involving children of 
the parties; and 
(3)(E) Refer appropriate cases to mediation programs if available. 
(4) Prohibitions. 
(4)(A) Commissioners shall not make final adjudications of domestic relations matters. 
(4)(B) Commissioners shall not serve as pro tempore judges in any matter except as provided by Rule of the Supreme 
Court. 
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Attorneys' Title Guarantee Fund, Inc. v. Alva 
Utah App., 1999. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
ATTORNEYS* TITLE GUARANTEE FUND, 
INC., a Colorado corporation; Edward Rollins; and 
Shanen Rollins, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Raul ALVA; Elaine Alva; David Knudson; and 
Guaranty National Insurance Co., a Utah 
corporation, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 981423-CA. 
June 4, 1999. 
Thor B. Roundy, Salt Lake City, for appellants. 
Mark O. Morris, Daniel E. Garrison, and Scott C. 
Sandberg, Salt Lake City, for appellees. 
Before WILKINS, BILLINGS, and DAVIS, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
BILLINGS. 
*1 Appellants filed a complaint against Appellee, 
asserting among other claims unjust enrichment, 
wrongful lien, and slander of title relating to their 
purchase of a judgment from Appellee. Soon after, 
Appellants moved the trial court for summary 
judgment. Appellee filed a cross motion for 
summary judgment. In response, Appellants sought 
more time for discovery pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56(f). The trial court denied 
Appellants' summary judgment motion, and agreed 
to permit Appellants to conduct discovery under 
Rule 56(f) before ruling on Appellee's summary 
judgment motion. 
Nearly four months passed, during which 
Appellants conducted no formal discovery. 
Appellee re-submitted his summary judgment 
motion for decision. In response, Appellants again 
requested a Rule 56(f) continuance, filing an 
affidavit almost identical to the one they had filed 
months before. The trial court refused to grant this 
request and entered summary judgment in 
Appellee's favor. Appellants filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration, arguing that the trial court should 
have granted them more discovery time under Rule 
56(f). The trial court denied this motion as well. 
Finally, Appellants filed a Motion for Relief from 
Judgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b)(1), which the trial court also denied. This 
appeal followed. 
We conclude the undisputed facts properly before 
the trial court at the time supported the trial court's 
original grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Appellee, which resulted in the dismissal of 
Appellants' claims against Appellee. 
The principal issue presented is whether the trial 
court erred in denying Appellants' Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment. "In relevant part, Rule 60(b) 
provides that a trial court may relieve a party of a 
judgment in case of: '(1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect.' " Ucfy v. Ucfy, 893 
P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah Ct .App. 1995) (quoting 
Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)). Moreover, " '[a] trial court 
has discretion in determining whether a movant has 
shown "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect," and this Court will reverse the 
trial court's ruling only when there has been an 
abuse of discretion.' " Udy, 893 P.2d at 1099 
(quoting Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 
1984). 
Appellants contend the trial court abused its 
discretion when it denied their Rule 60(b) motion 
because the court refused to grant them more 
discovery time when it had stated earlier that it 
would set no discovery deadline, and would not rule 
on either party's summary judgment motion until 
discovery was complete. We disagree. 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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Appellants rightly note that the trial court, following 
the filing of the first Rule 56(f) Affidavit, stated that 
summary judgment would not be ruled upon until 
discovery was completed. However, Appellants are 
incorrect in asserting that "the court's statement was 
not qualified in any way." Instead, the Trial Court 
Minute Entry dated February 25, 1997, reads: " 
[T]he Court will not rule on defendant Knudson's 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment until such 
time as a reasonable amount of time has elapsed 
for the completion of discovery related to both 
motions." (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, 
Appellants should have been on notice that they 
must inform the court of discovery that had been 
attempted or why discovery had not been completed 
after Appellee filed a second motion to submit for 
decision. Instead, Appellants merely filed a 
duplicate of their original Rule 56(f) affidavit. The 
only evidence before the court was a complete 
absence of formal discovery on the issues 
previously identified by Appellants for a period of 
almost four months. Given these facts, we cannot 
say the trial court abused its discretion in 
determining there was no surprise or excusable 
neglect. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants' 
Rule 60(b) Motion. 
WILKINS, P.J., and DAVIS, J., concur. 
Utah App., 1999. 
Attorneys' Title Guarantee Fund, Inc. v. Alva 
Not Reported in P.3d, 1999 WL 33244657 (Utah 
App.), 1999 UT App 179 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Utah App., 1999. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
BCW ENTERPRISES, INC., dba Warner Super 
Ford Store and Warner Truckland, Plaintiff and 
Appellee, 
v. 
Richard A. LUND and Karen L. Lund dba Lund 
Auto Repair, Defendants and Appellant. 
No. 981322-CA. 
June 24, 1999. 
Richard A. Lund, West Bountiful, pro se. 
Mark E. Medcalf and Mark S. Swan, Midvale, for 
appellee. 
Before GREENWOOD, BILLINGS, and ORME, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Official 
Publication) 
GREENWOOD. 
*1 Defendant Richard A. Lund appeals the trial 
court's denial of his motion to set aside a default 
judgment entered against him. We affirm.™1 
FN1. We deny Lund's motion for summary 
disposition because it was not timely filed 
under Rule 10(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. See Utah R.App.P. 
10(a) (requiring party to file motion for 
summary disposition within ten days after 
filing the docketing statement). 
Lund contends the trial court erred in refusing to set 
aside the default judgment against him under Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) because his failure 
to answer plaintiffs complaint constituted excusable 
neglect and because he has a meritorious defense to 
the claims against him.FN2 A " 'trial court is 
endowed with considerable latitude of discretion in 
granting or denying a motion to relieve a party from 
a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.C.P., and 
this court will reverse the trial court only where an 
abuse of this discretion is clearly established.' '% 
State v. Musselman, 661 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah 
1983) (citation omitted). 
FN2. We do not address defendant's other 
claims because we have determined they 
are without merit. See Atcitty v. San Juan 
County, 967 P.2d 1261, 1264 n. 2 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998). 
Lund argues that his failure to answer the complaint 
was excusable because he never received the 
written agreement from Mr. Swan. Lund admitted, 
however, that he was served with the complaint and 
provided no adequate explanation for his failure to 
answer. As the trial court concluded, it was not 
reasonable for Lund to assume that negotiations 
between him and plaintiffs attorney excused him 
from responding to plaintiffs complaint. See Pacer 
Sport and Cycle, Inc. v. Myers, 534 P.2d 616, 617 
(Utah 1975) (holding no excusable neglect under 
Rule 60 where debtor spoke with creditor's attorney 
and "assumed the action had been taken care of and 
therefore took no steps to file an answer to the 
complaint"). Therefore, we conclude Lund's failure 
to answer the complaint, while neglectful, was not 
excusable. 
Lund also argues that the default judgment against 
him should have been set aside because the notice 
of default was sent to the wrong address. We 
disagree. The address to which the notice was sent 
was the forwarding address Mr. Lund had listed 
with the post office. In addition, Mr. Lund had 
already received the complaint and was on notice 
that legal proceedings had commenced against him. 
His failure to ensure that his mail was sent to the 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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correct address did not constitute excusable neglect. 
In sum, Lund's explanation for failing to answer the 
plaintiffs complaint did not constitute excusable 
neglect under Rule 60(b)(l).FN3 Thus, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set 
aside the default judgment against Lund, and we 
accordingly affirm the trial court's decision. 
FN3. Because this conclusion is 
dispositive, we need not address whether 
Lund has a meritorious defense to 
plaintiffs complaint. See Musselman, 661 
P.2d at 1056 ("This latter question [of a 
meritorious defense] arises only after 
consideration of the first question [of 
excusable neglect] and a sufficient excuse 
therefrom being shown.") (Alterations in 
original.) (Citation omitted.) 
BILLINGS and ORME, JJ., concur. 
UtahApp.,1999. 
BCW Enterprises, Inc. v. lund 
Not Reported in P.3d, 1999 WL 33244655 (Utah , 
App.), 1999 UT App 203 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Hendry v. Critchfield 
UtahApp.,2005. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Michael L. HENDRY, Douglas Bassett, and Five "T 
" Corporation, Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
G. Lawrence CRITCHFIELD, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 20040772-CA. 
Dec. 8, 2005. 
Second District, Ogden Department, 990906932. 
The Honorable Roger S. Dutson. 
Steve S. Christensen, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Timothy W. Blackburn and Mara A. Brown, Ogden, 
for Appellees. 
Before Judges BENCH, GREENWOOD, and 
MCHUGH. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM. 
*1 G. Lawrence Critchfield appeals the district 
court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment 
under rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
"We review a district court's decision on a Rule 
60(b) motion to set aside a judgment under an abuse 
of discretion standard." Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT 
App 367,K 13, 38 P.3d 307. Additionally, review 
of such a decision is narrow in scope. See Franklin 
Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 
110,1[ 19, 2 P.3d 451. " 'An appeal of a Rule 60(b) 
order addresses only the propriety of the denial or 
grant of relief. The appeal does not, at least in most 
cases, reach the merits of the underlying judgment 
from which relief was sought. Appellate review of 
Rule 60(b) orders must be narrowed in this matter 
lest Rule 60(b) become a substitute for timely 
appeals." ' Id. (citations omitted). 
Critchfield asserts two reasons as to why the district 
court erred in refusing to set aside the judgment. 
First, he claims that the court committed a mistake 
by allowing a trial to take place in the absence of 
Critchfield or his attorney because the district court 
never signed an order granting his previous 
counsel's motion to withdrawal. As a result, 
Critchfield contends that the notice to appear or 
appoint he received from other counsel after the 
purported withdrawal was ineffective. Thus, he 
argues that because the motion to withdraw was not 
resolved, the trial should not have taken place. This 
is not the type of "mistake" rule 60(b) is meant to 
correct. See Franklin Covey Client Sales, 2000 UT 
App at f 22. Rule 60(b)(1) is meant to include 
only the correction of "a minor oversight, such as 
the omission of damages, which in most cases 
would be obvious." Id. (citations and quotations 
omitted). "If a court merely wrongly decided a point 
of law, that is not 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect." ' Id. (citations omitted). 
While Critchfield attempts to characterize the 
failure to sign the order of withdrawal as the type of 
minor oversight contemplated by the rule, the actual 
issue is the legal effect of the court's failure to sign 
the order. Specifically, the issue is whether the 
district court could go forward with a trial after 
failing to sign an order of withdrawal, but after 
Critchfield received a notice to appear or appoint. 
This does not allege a mistake or inadvertence. 
Rather, it alleges a mistake of law. Accordingly, 
Critchfield's proper remedy was to file either a 
motion under rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure or to file a direct appeal. Critchfield did 
neither. Therefore, the district court correctly 
denied Critchfield's motion on the ground of 
mistake. 
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Critchfield next argues that the district court erred 
in failing to grant his rule 60(b) motion because he 
demonstrated that through his excusable 
inadvertence, he was not aware of the trial date. The 
record contains sufficient facts to demonstrate that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the motion. Based upon the representations 
of his former attorney, Critchfield was the person 
who terminated his services. The certificate of 
service attached to the withdrawal documents 
indicated that they had been sent to Critchfield. 
Critchfield also received a notice to appear or 
appoint from opposing counsel. In response to that 
notice, and approximately three months prior to 
trial, Critchfield enlisted the assistance of an 
attorney to ascertain the current status of the case. 
After that brief attempt to determine the status of 
the case, Critchfield did nothing further to involve 
himself in the litigation until the day before trial, 
despite his receipt of one party's trial brief and trial 
subpoena. Under these circumstances, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 
Critchfield was not entitled to relief from the 
judgment due to Critchfield's inadvertence. 
*2 Finally, Critchfield argues that the district court 
erred when it awarded damages against him 
personally and awarded punitive damages without 
making adequate findings of fact. This issue is not 
properly before the court. Our review is strictly 
limited to issues raised by the district court's denial 
of Critchfield's rule 60(b) motion for relief from 
judgment. See Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92,1f 10, 
104 P.3d 1198. Because the issue was not raised in 
Critchfield's motion, the issue was not preserved for 
appeal.1^1 See Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 
945 P.2d 125, 129 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (concluding 
that to preserve issue for appeal a party must first 
raise the issue before the district court). 
not raised, the issue is not properly before 
us. 
We affirm. 
UtahApp.,2005. 
Hendry v. Critchfield 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2005 WL 3315327 (Utah 
App.), 2005 UT App 530 
END OF DOCUMENT 
FNl. By concluding that the issue was not 
preserved for appeal because it was not 
raised in the rule 60(b) motion, we do not 
imply that such an issue could be properly 
addressed in a rule 60(b) motion. We 
merely conclude that because our review 
of this appeal is limited to issues presented 
in the rule 60(b) motion, and this issue was 
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Mitchell v. Harrington Trucking, Inc. 
Utah App.,2000. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
In re the marriage of Dennis L. MITCHELL and 
Janet Robins Mitchell, Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
HARRINGTON TRUCKING, INC., Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 990187-CA. 
June 29, 2000. 
Scott W. Christensen and Jason M. Kerr, Salt Lake 
City, for appellant. 
Richard R. Golden and James A. Mclntyre, Murray, 
for appellees. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS, and ORME, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Official 
Publication) 
ORME. 
*1 An answer is defined as 
"[a] pleading by which defendant endeavors to 
resist the plaintiffs demand by an allegation of 
facts, either denying allegations of plaintiffs 
complaint or confessing them and alleging new 
matter in avoidance[.]" Black's Law Dictionary 84 
(5th ed.1979). An answer must "state in short and 
plain terms [the party's] defenses to each claim 
asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon 
which the adverse party relies." Utah R.Civ.P. 8(b). 
In Utah, pleadings are limited to a complaint and an 
answer; a reply to a counterclaim denominated as 
such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer 
contains a cross-claim; a third-party complaint, if a 
person who was not an original party is summoned 
under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party 
answer, if a third-party complaint is served. No 
other pleading shall be allowed.... 
Utah R.Civ.P. 7(a). Moreover, "[e]very pleading 
shall state the name and address of the party for 
whom it is filed; this information shall appear in the 
lower left-hand corner of the last page of the 
pleading." Utah R.Civ.P. 10(a). 
Harrington's document captioned "Objection" is not 
an answer or other pleading under these criteria. An 
objection is not included in Rule 7(a). The 
Objection in this case is based only on "the motion 
to intervene and the accompanying memoranda" 
filed by Harrington and asserts that "the facts and 
affidavits submitted by petitioner are insufficient to 
satisfy the requirements of Utah Code Annot. § 
30-1-4.5." It does not deny or controvert any of the 
allegations contained in the Petition.FN1 It does not 
include Harrington's address. Therefore, the 
Objection does not meet the technical requirements 
for a valid answer. On the contrary, it lacks all the 
hallmarks of a pleading fairly to be viewed as an 
answer. 
FN1. In fact, the Intervention 
Memorandum, filed with and relied on in 
the Objection, states that it will not address 
the elemental allegations of the Petition. 
More importantly, the Objection was not treated by 
those closest to the case as an answer. Having 
reviewed the file, which already contained the 
Objection, the trial court specifically instructed 
Harrington to file an answer-after an opportunity 
extended by the court for discovery so Harrington 
could plead intelligently in response to the petition. 
Harrington did not assert at that time that its answer, 
albeit styled as an Objection, was already of record. 
When it learned of the entry of default judgment 
against it, Harrington did not immediately contend 
that it was not in default because it had long since 
filed an answer. Rather, it came to the position that 
the Objection was an answer only as an 
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afterthought-in its reply memorandum in support of 
its motion to set aside the default judgment. 
Accordingly, Harrington failed to file a timely 
answer and default judgment was properly entered 
against it. 
Harrington also challenges the trial court's refusal to 
set aside the default judgement under Rule 60(b) 
for "excusable neglect." Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b). "A 
trial court has discretion in determining whether a 
movant has shown 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect,' and this Court will reverse 
the trial court's ruling only when there has been an 
abuse of discretion." Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 
52, 54 (Utah 1984). 
*2 Neglect, to be excusable, must occur despite the 
exercise of due diligence. See Airkem 
Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 68, 
513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973). Here, the trial court 
specifically held that the untimely filing of the 
answer by Harrington, whjle neglectful. was_jiot 
excusable because the trial court had imposed^a 
specific deadline tr> file an answer and had warned 
both sides that no further delays would be tolerated. 
The point is well made that Harrington should have 
been on a heightened sense of diligence as the 
deadline for filing its answer approached. We 
cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in 
holding Harrington's neglect was not excusable and, 
on that basis if no other, in refusing to set aside the 
default judgment. 
Affirmed. 
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
Utah App.,2000. 
Mitchell v. Harrington Trucking, Inc. 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33249366 (Utah 
App.), 2000 UT App 199 
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State ex rel. S.N.R. 
Utah App., 1999. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, in the interest of S.N.R., M.A.R., 
and J.R., persons under eighteen years of age. 
A.R. and W.R., Appellants, 
v. 
STATE of Utah, Appellee. 
No. 981536-CA. 
Oct. 7, 1999. 
Monica Z. Kelley, David C. Blum, and Gary L. Bell 
, Salt Lake City, for appellants. 
Jan Graham and John Peterson, Salt Lake City, for 
appellee. 
Martha Pierce and Karen Flynn, Salt Lake City, 
guardians ad litem. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS, and DAVIS, J J. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
DAVIS. 
*1 Appellants A.R. and W.R., respectively the 
father and mother of S .N.R., M.A.R., and J.R., 
appeal the trial court's denial of their motions under 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to set 
aside the order terminating their parental rights.™1 
Because appellants' absence from the trial on the 
petition was occasioned through their own 
voluntary conduct, we conclude that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants' 
motions. 
FN1. In their motions, appellants also 
moved to set aside the entry of default 
under Rule 55(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which motions the court 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
Page 1 
UT App 284 
granted. 
Appellants argue the trial court erred in denying 
their motion to set aside the termination order. 
Without assailing the court's conclusion that clear 
and convincing evidence adduced at the trial 
supported termination of their parental rights, 
appellants argue that termination should not have 
been ordered because they were absent from the 
hearing.™2 Specifically, they argue that the 
termination order here was rendered pursuant to a 
hearing at which they were involuntarily absent and 
thereby violated their right to due process. We 
review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to set 
aside a judgment for an abuse of discretion. See 
State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 
1132 (Utah 1989). 
FN2. A.R. also argues the termination 
order should have been set aside insofar as 
it was based upon the entry of default for 
appellants' failure to appear at the trial. 
However, because the trial court set aside 
the default but left the termination order 
intact based upon the evidence proffered at 
the adjudication hearing, we focus here 
only on appellants' arguments pertaining to 
the hearing. 
This court has previously explained that "parents 
have a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining 
family relationships with their children. Proceedings 
in which parental rights are terminated must 
accordingly comport with the requirements of Due 
Process. This does not mean, however, that parents 
have an absolute right to be in attendance at such 
proceedings." In re M.A.V. v. Vargas, 736 P.2d 
1031, 1033 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (citations 
omitted). Rather, by statute, parents have an 
absolute right "only to receive proper notice and to 
be advised of their right to counsel ." Id. at 1033; 
accordUtah Code Ann. § 78-3a-406(l), (2) (1996). 
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The trial court properly concluded that appellants 
were afforded an opportunity to present a defense. 
In support of this conclusion, the undisputed facts 
show that although W.R. received a courtesy notice 
showing that the hearing was to begin at 1:30 p.m., 
appellants were present at two conferences during 
which the correct time of the hearing was 
announced and the court's written orders indicated 
the correct time. Furthermore, ail other parties were 
present at 8:30 a.m., including counsel for 
appellants. Even assuming appellants relied upon 
the courtesy notice, had they maintained proper 
contact with their attorneys, rather than failing to 
exercise due diligence as the trial court found, they 
would have had no misunderstanding as to the 
correct time. Hence, appellants' absence resulted 
from their voluntary actions. See also In re M.A . V., 
136 P.2d at 1033-34 (affirming termination of a 
father's parental rights in his absence because the 
absence resulted from his choice to leave local 
incarceration and risk deportation). Appellants were 
not faced with an onerous burden and needed only 
to have maintained contact with their counsel or the 
court, or simply to have paid attention during the 
conferences when scheduled times were announced. 
*2 In light of these facts, the trial court clearly did 
not abuse its discretion in concluding that appellants 
"were not prevented from attending the trial by 
circumstances beyond their control," and in denying 
their motions to set aside the order. 
Affirmed. 
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
Utah App., 1999. 
State ex rel. S.N.R. 
Not Reported in P.3d, 1999 WL 33244698 (Utah 
App.), 1999 UT App 284 
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Craigf M. Bainum, 5913 
43 W. 9000 SoutL 
Danav, Utak 84070 
(801) 565-9136 
Attorney ror Petitioner 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH-PROVO 
Lecia Kennard 
Petitioner. 
v. 
Randy Kennard 
Respondent. 
ANSWER TO RESPONDENT'S 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS, 
INTERROGATORIES & 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Case Number 044402268 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Admit that the time of the divorce, excluding the 
home awarded the Petitioner, the parties assets consisted primarily of the following: 
a. (1) red Chevrolet passenger van approximately 10 years old which was purchased 
approximately one year before the separation for $2,500. 
b. (1) GMC suburban approximately 10 years old which was purchased 
approximately two years before the separation for $ 1,500. 
c. (1) Ford pickup approximately 20 years old, purchased approximately six months 
before the separation for $600. 
d. (1) Nissan Sentra car approximately ten years old purchased approximately one 
year before separation for approximately $2,000. 
e. (1) Honda Goldwing motorcycle approximately 20 years old purchased 
